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Jdude95 last won the day on October 12

Jdude95 had the most liked content!

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  1. I can confirm, in a rare twist of events, everything Skeet just said is true.
  2. Thanks man! I'm doing everything I can to get past it so I can at least make it tomorrow for the last day of this hearing. Andrew Fyfe seems fairly level headed and isn't just doing a "Ritchie" and blaming it all on someone else. He is being very open and honest and seems like he tried to suggest changes to management but they were denied and he was removed from the leadership team. I feel sorry for him because he tried to help but was chastised by insane and downright ridiculous management.
  3. Have you heard of the term "gargoyling"? That has pretty much been me the last couple of days... trust me when I say the coverage is literally shit. 😅
  4. He couldn't look them in the eyes when he knows how much of this he is personally responsible for. Such a coward.
  5. I'm still super sick so I've had to miss today but I can say that Mr Ritchie is very much trying to cover his ass as it's the one on the line here after previous evidence that has been given. He has pushed all the blame onto the ride ops and refuses to believe this could even happen. If it was up to Mr Ritchie, he would have hosed off the blood and turned the ride back on.
  6. Part of the reason for contacting Intamin in 2016 was due to rafts taking on water and the ride having to shut down for 30 minutes each day to drain the water from the rafts. In June 2016, Dreamworld got in contact with another company “dynamic attractions” about replacing the rafts. They quoted $12k per raft for 10 new rafts. It appears as though the contract with Dynamic Attractions was in its final stages before the incident happened. The Intamin communications were just emails back and forward. A company named “PFi” was contracted to undertake the PLC upgrades in 2015-16. There was also discussions in August 2016 about having a compressor replaced on the ride too. This was brought up recently and discussed heavily. I believe @AlexB(?) figured out that old arrow trains had this ability but the new Kumbak trains couldn’t, which was part of the reason for the upgrade. I think it was mentioned in a news piece on ABC or Channel 7, when they obtained documents from Dreamworld and that was the first time it had come out that sidewinder had that issue. Mr Watkins has just finished giving evidence and we have adjourned for lunch. I unfortunately have to depart again but rest assured I’ll be back tomorrow morning.
  7. In October 2004, a guest was being unloaded from their raft in the station when another raft collided with it causing the guest to fall in the water and go under a raft. In 2014, within a week of the the raft collision on TRR, there was an incident on the Hotwheels Sidewinder where a train was dispatched from the station with a guests restraint not being locked down. Both ride operators were terminated. JAK, a ride audit company, recommended in 2014 that the TRR controls be simplified as it relies on far too much manual operation from the ride op. Today was the first time that Mr Watkins had seen the 2014 cctv footage from TRR. Mr Watkins agreed that it would have been helpful if he had seen that footage previously or if that footage reviewed during the 2015-16 time where the ride was upgraded. In 2014, an email was circulated around Dreamworld Staff about theme park incident overseas on a roller coaster at Six Flags Fiesta Texas where a woman died as a result of a failed safety harness. In that email, the 2001 TRR incident was also brought up and included photos of the rafts that had stacked in the unload station. It literally looks like someone has dumped 5 rafts from the sky into the unload station and conveyor area. There are rafts literally sitting on top of each other. One of the recommendations in 2015 was a $10000 upgrade to the controls Included in this recommendation: “The existing operator controls have been adapted and added to over many years and are in a poor state. This scope (of work being completed) should be expanded to include the upgrade of the operator co from panel. This would include: the addition of a 7inch touch screen, it would monitor all alarms, water levels and pump loads. This will also control all of the arrival and exit gates.” “This would future proof the ride for years to come” Dreamworld opted to not implement these upgrades, just the anti-rollback gates and conveyor chainbreak upgrade.
  8. Firstly, sorry about missing yesterday, I was super sick and couldn’t leave the house, wasn’t fun but I’m back up and rubbing today... except the delays on the motorway that got me here slightly late. So let’s begin today. Mark Watkins - engineering and maintenance supervisor. Mr Watkins has never seen a risk assessment document for TRR. If there was a fault or issue with a ride, Mr Watkins was the person in charge of making the call whether to reopen a ride or not. Mr Watkins confirmed that the rapids alarms were sounded to alert all available staff to come assist as guests may need to be retrieved from rafts on the course or in the reservoir. Mr Watkins states that both the north and south pumps had faults in the past but can’t recall a number of times. If there was a pump failure, the maintenance staff would attempt to reset and then restart the pump and run rafts around the course to make sure it’s working. Mr Watkins discussed with attractions supervisors as to whether the ride should re-open after the pump trip on the day of the incident. After numerous tests rafts were sent around without an issue, Mr Watkins made the decision to re-open the ride. Mr Watkins mentioned that rafts bottoming out from pulp failures was a common and not a cause for concern. Mr Watkins states that if there is an electrical issue, only the electricians are allowed to assess the situation. Mr Watkins advised other staff members to not try and rectify electrical issues and instead to escalate it to the electricians. Mr Watkins states that every breakdown he has attended on TRR, the conveyor has been stopped. They have just shown the CAPEX application form for the control systems upgrade to TRR, these included new controls to prevent rafts slipping down the conveyor and potentially flipping. Mr Watkins cannot remember that ever happening to warrant the change. Mr Watkins states that it was just preventative updates. Also included on the form was the chainbreak and anti-rollback gates for the TRR conveyor. New safety controls weren’t added, just the chain break and anti-rollback gates. There was an email that went from Mr Watkins in mid 2016 about issues with the temperatures of the south pump being higher than the north pump. Mr Watkins reached out to Intamin in 2016 about obtaining replacement rafts as intamin had similar rafts and ride types. Intamin was confused as they hadn’t designed the ride but after looking at videos and photos online, they would be able to deliver rafts that would fit the Dreamworld TRRR requirements. Intamin suggested sending out a single raft to be used on the ride as testing to ensure it would fit and be appropriate before getting more. Intamin also offered a discount for buying a whole new set of rafts. Presumably because they didn’t want their rafts mixed in with in-house designed rafts. The engineering team never received any OEM’s or ride updates about TRR as it was built in-house and there was no system in place to ensure it was up to date with all other rides of similar types around the world. All other rides would regularly receive updates from the manufacturer but as TRR didn’t have an original manufacturer, it was mostly just common sense and past experience that was used by engineering staff. Mr Watkins believes the upgrades to the ride in early 2016 weren’t made because there was an incident that happened, they were just proactive maintenance and safety features. Mr Watkins cannot recall if there was a specific person who sought out ride updates or procedures as they always assumed the ride was safe. Mr Watkins was also never made aware of the 2001, 2004 or 2014 incidents that occurred on TRR.
  9. The biggest part that everyone doesn't understand is this; it affects everyone differently. Some paramedics are so desensitised that they can easily brush things like this off, hell even a ride operator could if they were that kind of person. I personally am the kind of person who could brush off seeing something like this happen but I know that it's not the same for everyone, in fact, its the complete opposite for some. I know some paramedics who take every single thing they see, home with them. Some need to take a few minutes after a difficult job and some just see it as a job and don't let seeing such gruesome things stick with them. I personally know some of the QAS paramedics who attended the scene. I know them through family members who works with them. Most of them weren't negatively affected by this at all. There were of course a couple who are still having problems coping with witnessing the aftermath of that. These people see some of the most horrendous scenes every day, sometimes there's specific ones that stick with you, sometimes you never forget a single one. Everyone is different and I really feel sorry for the people in the civil case against Ardent because they may be professionals in the medical field but they still witnessed something truly insane.
  10. So I left after Ms Knight's evidence as I had to take the person I was going to the hearing with, back to the airport. As far as I am aware, Jason Johns, the next witness didn't provide anything major or new in regards to the case so I didn't miss much. Here is the link to yesterdays document: https://tinyurl.com/Thursday-inquest And here's todays: https://tinyurl.com/Friday-inquest There are many things I could say about Ms Knights evidence today but I really must refrain. What I will say is that she was very frustrating to get information out of and many of her answers were confusing or contradictory to previous answers she had given. Ms Knight appeared to be in quite a high level role yet seemed to have very minimal responsibilities or knowledge of her scope of responsibilities and powers. It was very difficult to listen to and quite concerning but I am so very glad that all of this is finally coming out. Such Damning evidence that points towards a complete failure of most aspects of that park.
  11. Ms Knight states that no one was ever disciplined for using an e-stop button. In February 2016, a new button was added to the main control panel, a blue “conveyor reset” button that was stated in the memo to staff, to only be used by engineering. This was the same time the e-stop button was installed in the unload area. The memo states “to ONLY use that e-stop in the event of an emergency, in the emergency shut down procedure follows”. A later memo went out to clarify that this button was to be used if there is a risk to “guest safety or well being” “ride operator procedure” “damage to the equipment” and that “activating this button will cause the ride conveyor to stop”. When Ms Knight was asked about the main e-stop button on the control panel, she confirmed it is the final button in the sequence of 3-4 buttons to shut the ride down completely. Ms Knight was asked about the unlabelled e-stop at the unload platform and if she knew why it was unlabelled. Ms Knight answered “no”.
  12. Upcoming maintenance and Inspections requests wouldn’t be emailed to the safety team, they would go to the attractions supervisory team who did by play a part in the safety role in the park. The discussions around extra CCTV monitoring and a simplified shutdown process took place in October 2015, a full year before the incident. These changes were never implemented. Ms Knight was shown a risk assessment form and asked if she’s ever seen one. Mr Knight cannot recall ever seeing or completing any risk assessment form. Ms Knight was shown a different style of risk assessment form and asked if she had seen it before. Ms Knight replied “no”. After the incident, Ms Knight never thought that there could have been a training issue with the operators. Ms Knight also wasn’t aware of any issues with the ride on the days leading up to the incident.
  13. Jennie Knight Senior Attractions supervisor and trainer. Still employed at Dreamworld. Ms Knight believes the Unload e-stop had never been pressed while the ride was operating. Only while the ride was testing. If there is a policy change or update, trainers would check back in with ride operators to make sure they were across the process. Ms Knight wasn’t involved in the 2016 incident. There had been previous conversations in regards to the 3-4 step shutdown procedure and how it should be simplified but it was never implemented. This was also discussed around the same time as the discussions about the extra CCTV monitoring abilities for TRR control panel operators. Ms Knight was unsure if there was anyone who completed structural inspections of rides such as rust and crack testing. Ms Knight believes that if it was done, it would be handled by the safety department. Ms Knight was never involved with training, trainers who would train ride operators. When ride maintenance was coming up, senior attractions staff were asked if there was anything they wanted added or implemented to it ride. These changes would then need to be assessed against CAPEX funding and have a full application process. Ms Knight was aware there were two different e-stop buttons on TRR but was not aware that they did two different things. Ms Knight also can’t confirm if she was ever at the ride when an e-stop was pressed. Ms Knight would only be informed of the e-stop being pressed, at the end of the day. Ms Knights role focussed mainly on rides, safety and managing the Attractions team. Ms Knight has been employed at Dreamworld since 2007 and has been an attraction supervisor since 2012. Ms Knight wasn’t involved in discussing any improvements for rides. Ms Knight wasn’t involved with training or disciplinary action for any ride operators. Ms Knight would occasionally check up on trainees to see if they needed the trainer to come back. Ms Knight was asked if she was involved in safety in the park, she replied “no”. Ms Knight advises that she would write the procedures and operate the rides. Ms Knight isn’t aware of who writes and publishes staff memorandums. Ms Knight states that she was mostly tasked with walking around the park and making sure staff were following procedure. Ms Knight states that she wouldn’t handle memos and similar documents as she wasn’t very good with a computer.
  14. It was recommended by Ms Ramsey during the issue about the operators cctv monitor that there be 1 monitor with 4 split screens and 1 monitor dedicated to the CCTV that monitored the conveyor area but these weren’t implemented. After Ms Ramsey handed the small child to someone else, she went back to assessing the scene and patients and began questioning the ride ops about the amount of passengers still on the ride and in the flipped raft. And we have just adjourned for today. We will resume tomorrow. This is due to Ardent lawyers providing required documents so late. It’s appearing as though the inquest will be delayed further and push into next year. We’re still waiting to see if things stay on schedule but it isn’t looking promising
  15. For clarification on the Shine Lawyers civil action suit against Dreamworld, the 4 staff members involved in that case are the two safety officers from yesterday, Mr Green and Mr Clark. Also included is today’s witness, Ms Ramsey and a witness still to be called, Mr Burke, a former engineer at the park. When Ms Ramsey arrived onsite, she was handed a young child to get out of the station area while trying to ascertain how many people were on the ride. She wasn’t sure if the child was on the ride or not prior to being handed to her. Ms Ramsey doesn’t believe anything could have been done to locate the 4th person that was later found trapped under the water, any sooner. There was no single person in control of the situation, there were multiple people dealing with multiple Different roles when they arrived onsite.