dbo121

Jdude end of day would be good. Having names on does not matter at a public inquest.

Does a big red looking e stop button need a label ? ( assume this was in the panel ) Did the ride technically fail due to underspend ? No water pump failures have always been common, frequency of failure may have been higher . Would more safety staff or an earlier external audit prevent the accident ? Doubt it people had become complacent. multiple things leading to unlikely event. Not sure a pro active risk culture would have solved.. just reduced likelihood. a better ride system reducing human input is the key 🔑

Yes it’s a moot point. But still want to know all the finer details. If this fact is correct though it would have been asked to Courtney.

Don’t forget workplace qld and those external auditors . Were they as proactive as they should have been? They both had the power to force a shutdown , not just suggest improvements.

Comments like your an idiot are not necessary and probably should be reviewed by moderators .

Read words more carefully. Not the exact same incident ...( obviously) Despite initial design fault ..I also highlight internal mods... to assume incidents can’t happen at vrtp because of existing policies and procedures in place is dangerous. There is always room for improvement. For example when and how external audits are completed will effect all theme parks going forwards. My points raised are relevant and rational . They are not arguments . It’s a forum of conversation .No need for bad language. Spelling .. my bad.

Could still happen with conitinuos load if load slow. Some removed planks from conveyor which may have also increased change of getting stuck. why could this not happen at vrtp? Maybe not the exact same event but incidents happen . Let’s not forget what happened in green lantern . People were lucky to not loose their life’s. I’m sure an external engineering firm also signs of new rides when auditing despite it being an initial design fault as per TRR. a better risk culture should have identified flipping as an issue after 2001 whether or not there was a raft moored after that incident. Lets not forget the probability of incident increased over time . Modifications to conveyor, unload station put in space closer to conveyor, rails put underneath to stabilise rafts after coming of conveyor all increased the chance .

100percent at fault to be attributed to someone ( ie 1 entity or person) is not going to occur. There are a number of parties. Ardent, the dreamworld Mangement team, regulator, government, external engineering auditor etc. that said one party could bear the brunt of it

At least motocoaster in a well spaced area. Ignoring all the theming issues. Just simple design would suggest a lot of cramming has occurred with the trolls village out there.

How does that fit in with the trolls village smack right in front of it?

Ie if you know the ride. I would not define it in close or a useful proximity.

Seems very logical Joel too otherwise the deckhand should have been trained to hit the button at the actual unload station if it existed. It seems a weak design to place the instant conveyor stop at a distance away from the deckhand operator existed. That distance would take more than 7 seconds to cover alone. I think that there should have been stops for the two operators in their reach and no excuse for that button other than to do an instant cut off for the entire ride. Not just conveyor. This was a big ride with a lot of water so maybe more hesitance and pressure to avoid using though. When we hear from ardent or the engineering auditor some of these things will arise

Higher probaility of operator error because of its manual nature of operation. Not saying it was a death trap. Just higher probability of incidents occurring due to manual error and manual panels. To recreate they did not try to operate over the same period of years of operation. The operators were setup to fail a higher probability of times. Combine that with the capabilities required at a minimum to be hired as a ride operator . An automated system would have reduced the chance of incident .

It is an old ride. Limited automation. a black box for all rides is wishful thinking . What is odd about what I read today is that the operator hit the stop and went to unload . Thought the stop did not engage and went back to hit the button a few more times. Any control operational defects have not been presented or highlighted thus far besides pump failure and hence if the button was pushed in this event why did the operator need to go back as the ride would have shutdown by then. In hindsight a loss of water pressure should have been an automatic shutdown. Best risk practice would involve avoiding human intervention. Getting low paid people with or without a degree of experience to operate these manual machines sometimes can be catastrophic as has occurred . They were setup to fail.

At the unload point

It’s not for them to administer . The nurse or security would be called. Note most people have fire training.

I note the word closest.. don’t disagree with abc but Fairfax !

Are you serious? Media can state one point from some facts but not all the points to make a story . It’s called sensational journalism.

Be careful of believing snippets of information. For example a light on the main control panel illuminated if water pump failed /turned off could have turned on. ( not sure if that is true of false but just using for example of info missed) This may or may not have existed but don’t take one comment via a b grade media producer re scum lines being relied on only without further thought.

Touché. The point I was making the sensor would not stop the raft at certain points. Only start an alarm meaning push button to move raft along. It sounds like this happened every 15 seconds. Which appears not enough given it took 7 seconds for a shutdown. It’s a mute point though. There should have been automated fail safes reducing operator input as per modern rides . Did this ride require a higher level of operator for the main panel (was classified level 4 bracket a decade or so back ) like the log ride because of its manual nature ? Block or water level sensors. All the above could have stopped it without human input. I think our interest in this is fuelled by the tragic losses. My sincere condolences to families in particular involved.

This is an inquest. Prosecutions may follow at another time. At an inquest defendants cannot defend themselves. Will be interesting if that occurs during a potential prosecution unless there are out of court settlements. As for the license yes a workplace and a ride has one. Question there is how to you get one and what are the monitoring/renewal standards etc for theme parks in particular or ride operators. These might need change following inquest outcomes .

Sensor and block sensors are two different types of sensors.

It’s not odd about share price if you believe in market efficiency. My understanding is no block sensors except in unload/load section which were there to alert attendant to push rafts through only.. at least not in the 10 years prior.

This is a very good point. Should only discuss evidence and not conclude. Still my evidence raised was not correct in discussion. If you replaced that with 10 seconds or even less still I am content with my postings for today. Cannot avoid different interpretations though. That’s what makes a conversation .

My statement on 57 seconds was incorrect . No blame was assigned to any party involved except to say many are involved. How that gets weighted well I am not going to speculate. There are a lot of could haves and would haves hence it’s evident that there are multiple factors leading to breakdowns in the system.