Levithian

They didnt get paid when it flooded and people were sent home apparently. That was just a number of hours. What happens when thats weeks?

In before people start complaining they are just being used as billboards with round the clock ads.

Not sure how it works at disney, but apparently VRTP staff wont get paid if they close any of their parks as there is something in their contracts that means they dont have to if they shutdown. So its probably a pretty big consideration if/when they close and how long for, the hardships it will cause staff. Youd just be listening to government advisers. They havent closed schools yet for example. 2 weeks, even a month isnt going to make you safe while its still spreading. People are going to keep getting sick even though cricket and footy are closed games. How long does it go on for? Is there a point where the risk is low enough to resume? Because you cant completely remove the threat.. Will it slow progress? I guess thats their point, but how do you stop multiple waves occurring? Do you close parks for 2 weeks anytime there is a positive test from a guest or staff member? This could drag on for months. That chief medical officer was saying it may be mid year before peak is reached .

about to drop lower as soon as coronavirus hits.

I dont know many people that look behind them. Or do we need a diagram?

You can hide things like scene/screen transitions or gaps in the physical sets by moving the car away from sight lines that make these things really visible and ruin the immersion is what im getting at. You have a lot of control over what people are looking at. Dont literally need to build out the whole set from floor to ceiling to make sure you dont have any bleed from the previous scene. You can just rotate the car away and towards the start of the next scene on the opposite side.

Trackless drive systems like this are just amazing. Look how much more scope you have viewing wise when you can turn the car 90 degrees and keep driving forward or backwards, or sidewards. Hell, you can even do a pirouette if you want. Everyone is looking exactly what you want them to focus on because you can just move the position of the car. So much more immersive and seamless when you really have no feeling for exactly where you are going.

Of all places to find a kinda weird dedication to gaudi, i guess japan ranks highly on the "what is this doing here" meter.

Do you seriously think 15 mins is going to save them a bunch of money? The couple of rides you actually noticed probably had delayed openings for a reason. Operations staff have checks and runs to do once maintenance are done, so maybe there were hold ups that impacted the whole morning.

Still not as deadly as influenza. Mortality rate is lower too so far. Media will (and are) ride this into the ground using fear to make money. Everyone else will suffer and they will have an active hand in sending some businesses to the wall. So that means we havent reached anywhere near peak yet. The stock market is the greatest risk. If things keep falling, retirement/super savings are the least of our worries. Super funds are some of the largest private financers of infrastructure projects in the country. They have billions of dollars at their disposal and even the federal government go to them for loans. If we see another round of "corrections", what does it start to do if their own investments are being impacted and the economy is going backwards. Will they be so interested in making a couple hundred billion dollar investment in federal plans over the next 5 years?

The proper people were in china last year and have put up another urbex, this time a trip to a sinking waterpark.

Maybe some of you may think a little differently if you remember that the engineering manager was previously a supervisor at movieworld, so standing there saying you didnt know you needed to do risk assessments, had no formal process for modifying or documenting repairs or didnt know it was part of your job just doesnt fly. Id be willing to bet money there is paperwork burried within the archives at vrtp that has his name on a bunch of processes doing exactly those things. It's lucky the coroner didnt hand down a reccomendation OIR seek to prosecute individual people because he might have been in a lot of trouble if they went digging for evidence. Edit: by saying that i mean it potentially shows someone was negligent in their duties and can be legally held accountable.

No it doesnt. It says that Mr Ritchie agree that the current proposed upgrades required addressing now, thats all. He goes further to state that additional changes were intended to be completed after these immediate upgrades, but acknowledges this was only in discussion. He felt strongly enough about the additional upgrades to include them in his proposal and actually says the upgrades would improve safety, so how can you say he felt otherwise? The inquest finds that such measures should have been implemented and that if any risk analysis had been performed they would have been highlighted. Mr Ritchies proposal should have been enough to trigger investigation. The engineering supervisor agreed the additions were warranted, and thats basically as far it went. The issue of ride operation and low water level danger needs no addressing because everyone, right down to dreamworld, their policies and the ride operations manual ALL agree it is. You cannot say it is or isnt implied, when it has been outlined how important it is. It causes a ride safety stoppage and the conveyor is manually halted and immediate assistance is required. This is why the employee was fired in 2014 because it explicitly states that the conveyor cannot be restarted during low water levels like what follows a pump failure, and that operators are not permitted to restart pumps without seeking approval. He did both of this and was fired. So, knowing all this, if a skilled, engineering employee creates a proposal seeking to address monitoring of water levels and implementing an automatic control measure; do you think this is done because it is a critical risk already highlighted and understood, or do you think there is still some conjecture as to if he felt the water level was a safety risk at all and just proposed the additions for seemingly monetary value? Even if you want to argue he had no idea, someone above did or should have. And if they didnt, the person above them should have. The proposal shouldnt have been ignored, it should have been followed up and investigated. The engineering manager even agrees this should have happened and this is simply just another example of the opportunity dreamworld had to address a critical flaw in the rides operation which was mismanaged. Which is what the report finds.

Im thinking were the disagreements are coming from is maybe because the mechanical side of the findings ia really two part. If you view it like this, it kinda clears things up a bit. As far as safety goes, the water level is the primary factor. You cannot dispute this and its why there is even talk of a level system control. Mitigate the water level problem and the entire safety risk is removed. This is agreed upon by investigators, both engineers and the police. Secondary, and the other major factor is the conveyor continued to run in this state. These are the main contributing factors that pose a continual risk at all times across years and were not mitigated, ever. This means there has always been these underlying risks in its operation that should have been addressed over its 30 years. In addition to these, the state of the conveyor, in regards to slats, etc and the gap between the rails in the trough and the front of the conveyor were highlighted, along with the inadequate e-stop placement/system as major contributing factors to this incident occurring. That is it is specific in this incident only and deemed that addressing either the state of the conveyor or the gap between the rails and the conveyor would have likely meant this incident would not have occurred. Again, this specific to this incident. Its why the report noted earlier comments by bob tan about rafts flipping over completely. The underlying issues with the ride since its commissioning were still there. Its why the report makes mention of even if these specific contributing issue were addressed or the factors had not occurred, there was still an underlying unacceptable risk that needed addressing which could cause further incidences different to this one which killed people.

Its because you keep reading in point form. Go back and read the whole testimony. It shows a discussion on conveyor safety occurred and the front end of the conveyor wasnt considered for upgrade. How do you know the risk was even considered? Because the employee notes that the intended upgrades being completed now would provide monitoring or all alarms, all water levels and the pump loads. What the report is saying is the employee identified a possible risk, was not tasked with mitigating that risk, but still put forward a proposal to Upgrade the control system to mitigate that risk. It goes on to state that it was his view that this could be performed to enhance safety and save the company money. It states that these issues were put forward to the engineering supervisor via email. Section 135 confirms these discussions and acknowledges Mr Ritchie raising the danger and putting forward additions to the planned works. It literally says the engineering supervisor agrees with his proposal for additional works but that it could not be completed at this stage, and to focus on the upgrades to the bottom. Further to this, in section 139 , later discussions about this additional works were had with the company (PFI) during a site visit in August 2015. This means the discussion and the proposal put forward by Mr Ritchie occurred prior to this and tha the engineering manager deemed them important enough to raise with pfi. Even if by his own account this was informal, but by later admission, this is largely how much of their work was planned. Voiced rather than documented. Futhermore, scroll down to section 144 and have a read how eerily similar the log ride operation was. In 2013 pfi was tasked by the same engineering manager with performing an upgrade that included water level monitoring on the log ride. It goes on to show from records that the engineering manager identified this risk, how important water level management was, and that he personally viewed the ride operation, was made aware that boats could crash into each other and deemed an upgrade was required to stop this from happening. So, the same engineering manager raised the very same issues back in 2013 and proposed they be addressed by upgrades to control systems to monitor water levels, and even proposed that a block system needed to be in place to stop boats coming off and crashing into each other. He tasked pfi with planning and quoting this upgrade which was performed. The whole cost of implementing all these systems was $16000. Why were these same issues not investigated with the river rapids ride? The engineering manager states that even though significant upgrades were performed to the log ride, no risk assessment was ever completed either. Not before or afterwards. WTF?! It speaks to management performing works and making changes without proper planning or analysis. So yes. The report finds the water level is of primary importance and that an automated control system should be in place to halt the ride and operation of the conveyor in the event it occurs. They are not talking about indicator lights being installed if water level monitoring was installed because they already found warning lights signifying the pump stoppage on the control panel were an inadequate control system. Further to this point, talk of a safety interlock being installed for the conveyor is exactly what you are querying. An interlock shuts off power to a device and it cannot be restarted or reset until the issue is rectified. It means it has the ability to stop it being restarted in the event of a failure which would address a situation like the 2014 incident where the operator was dismissed from occurring. We can argue sensors vs conveyor and how it would be implemented all we want but the report says it best really. They knew the rafts can hit. They knew the rafts could be lifted and even flipped. They knew the water level was critical for the ride to function. They knew people were not capable of managing the risk on the ride and had fired an employee to the fact. They knew all this from in house incidences and experiences and did little to mitigate or exclude the risk of injury or death and are entirely to blame for the tragedy.

How can you infer that? It clearly states and is the view of multiple parties that a safety feature that monitored water levels is what was needed. The conveyor is already monitored and gated. How is it the problem? That they are proposing is that the water level monitoring would have, within seconds of the pump stopping, halted the conveyor. This would have caused a ride safety fault. This was 100% relied upon by humans to judge. The report found this completely unacceptable, because even someone completely aware of the water level dropping would not be expected to react in time, and the difference between human and automated process would prevent an incident like this occurring 100% Its why they keep ramming home the phrase risk assessment. Its literally a document that studies what is at risk, the potential for injury or death, how this risk can be mitigated or removed completely. They are so common they are used daily, across multiple facets. It shouldnt have even been a yearly thing, one should have been performed anytime someone was to work on the ride or attend a shut down because there is a massive risk to staff when working on plant equipment like this, so assessments remove complacency about the dangers of being in that environment. Following multiple shutdowns, the incidents should have been debriefed within the management team. Dreamworld acknowledged they have meetings that do exactly that, address failures and breakdowns. This is when further risk to ride operation should have been discussed. Its why the report finds there is a systemic failure within the management of the park as every level of management ultimately failed to manage the risk.

You missed the reasoning for the proposal, not the physical plans for the upgrade. Its in the paragraph above it. Starts at paragraph 129.

Heres another from the senior investigating the incident. "WOULD HAVE COMPLETELY PREVENTED THIS INCIDENT FROM OCCURRING".

It's not evwn remotely the same. It's different when youve had multiple incidents in the past that have lifted the rafts due to water level; youve had an incident where it was shown one of your most experienced operators was not able to manage the ride operation when a low water level fault occurrs, placing people in danger; By your own proceedures acknowledge low water levels are an extremely dangerous situation, cause for a ride stoppage due to safety issues; AND The issue had been highlighted a number of times in the past by inspections and staff and was considered important enough to quote for the upgrade, but was never acted upon. Experts testified exactly that. Including one of the police investigators. The 10k cost included water level and plc upgrade. Heres an example. This expert was one tasked by the Office of Industrial Relations to investigate the ride control systems and its operation after the incident..

Bulk buy? Two for 1? 😄

It was noted that at the time the above was raised in regards to implementing an upgrade the cost was $10,000. At this time the engineering manager acknowledged the proposal but directed that the existing plan for upgrades of sensors at the start of the conveyor preventing roll back was the focus. Nothing further was done. $2500 each. Someone, or a group of someones decided that our lives werent worth $2500. Lets make no mistake, while a number of failures had to occurr for the incident to play out, the report makes it clear that it was sheer luck, not good or proper management that further (or earlier) deaths had not occurred. $2500. Each. Let that sink in. What does $2500 buy you? A new tv? A used car? A short holiday? Its abhorrent a life is reduced to such a worthless sum. These people ruined 4 lives directly, destroyed families in the process, exposing kids to something adults are not capable of handling, and resulted in many people, their own staff included suffering psycological trauma they are still dealing with. None of you should have any jobs. Many of you should be turned out for contributing directly to their deaths and face the possibility of jail time, and any penalties leveled at ardent should be so severe that any company even contemplating putting a price on the lives and safety of your guests and staff should only have to mention the name dreamworld before being instantly aware of their stupidity. Ill be really fucking surprised if the company is even penalised a 7 figure sum. And thats a god damn travesty the qld government should automatically appeal because its in the interests of the whole country that an element of justice is actually served and someone, if not multiple people have been held to account.

Excellent break down provided. Very well done. The whole report is like a textbook of how not to maintain safe operational control of a theme park. I got to about page 180 of the report before i needed a break. Its hard reading, frustrating, makes you angry, makes you mad. Its really all over the place with the complete almost cascading like failure through just about all levels of management. Its literally like a bunch of these people got together and collectively decided nobody told them how to do their jobs, so that absolves them of any responsibility. We will just pretend theres nothing to address. Thats before you get to the actual findings on the ride which basically reduce it down to a few things; Water level. Lack of automated monitoring of water level tied into a safety system that would halt the ride when water level drops below a safe level. Lack of a single dedicated estop that halts all operation and a complex stop proceedure. Gap between conveyor and axle to the supporting rails in the trough was an issue and should have been picked up by any competent engineer. Gaps between slats on conveyor. Staff training, competency and understanding of ride operation, largely due to inadequate operational proceedures all staff should base their training upon. A number of upgrades were proposed that would improve operational safety. It was noted in particular that the lack of warning or automated stoppage due to water level dropping after pump failure was a direct contributor to the deaths. The danger was highlighted with previous incidents, including the last incident that lead to an operators dismissal. At no stage were these issues improved upon or addressed to prevent similar breakdown in operation of the ride both at a mechanical and operations (staff) level. On top of that, these failings were not shared with other staff and a number of managers had no knowledge of previous incidents. There was really, really disturbing insight into the lack of documentation, error reporting and compliance that existed in most departments which was highlighted by a number of independant auditors, even when not tasked with actual ride investigation. Poor implementation of recommendations and lack of improvement were noted, though big improvements had been made in the lead up to the accident. Basically, the short short version of what happened on the day is stuff went wrong. A Combination of existing design, uncontrolled modification, faults during operation and operation of the ride on the day contributed to the deaths. There was enough opportunity to address a number of issues which would have reduced risk or completely prevented the deaths from occuring. None of these actions were taken by ardent or park management and directly contributed to the deaths.

It seems like there is as they have referred it to them. Its entirely up to the OIR to decide if they will follow through with it though. The coroner has nothing to do with civil or industrial action. They cant say someone is culpable and hand out fines. They cant prosecute someone essentially. Its an office that is supposed to stay neutral and hand down the facts as investigated.

There is only ever one inquest by the coroner. Civil lawsuits will follow, plus maybe any industrial action like jail time and fines. That all depends on if OIR (office industrial relations) thinks they have enough evidence to launch prosecution.

They are at a yard in arundel. On kendor street.