Levithian

Its because you keep reading in point form. Go back and read the whole testimony. It shows a discussion on conveyor safety occurred and the front end of the conveyor wasnt considered for upgrade. How do you know the risk was even considered? Because the employee notes that the intended upgrades being completed now would provide monitoring or all alarms, all water levels and the pump loads. What the report is saying is the employee identified a possible risk, was not tasked with mitigating that risk, but still put forward a proposal to Upgrade the control system to mitigate that risk. It goes on to state that it was his view that this could be performed to enhance safety and save the company money. It states that these issues were put forward to the engineering supervisor via email. Section 135 confirms these discussions and acknowledges Mr Ritchie raising the danger and putting forward additions to the planned works. It literally says the engineering supervisor agrees with his proposal for additional works but that it could not be completed at this stage, and to focus on the upgrades to the bottom. Further to this, in section 139 , later discussions about this additional works were had with the company (PFI) during a site visit in August 2015. This means the discussion and the proposal put forward by Mr Ritchie occurred prior to this and tha the engineering manager deemed them important enough to raise with pfi. Even if by his own account this was informal, but by later admission, this is largely how much of their work was planned. Voiced rather than documented. Futhermore, scroll down to section 144 and have a read how eerily similar the log ride operation was. In 2013 pfi was tasked by the same engineering manager with performing an upgrade that included water level monitoring on the log ride. It goes on to show from records that the engineering manager identified this risk, how important water level management was, and that he personally viewed the ride operation, was made aware that boats could crash into each other and deemed an upgrade was required to stop this from happening. So, the same engineering manager raised the very same issues back in 2013 and proposed they be addressed by upgrades to control systems to monitor water levels, and even proposed that a block system needed to be in place to stop boats coming off and crashing into each other. He tasked pfi with planning and quoting this upgrade which was performed. The whole cost of implementing all these systems was $16000. Why were these same issues not investigated with the river rapids ride? The engineering manager states that even though significant upgrades were performed to the log ride, no risk assessment was ever completed either. Not before or afterwards. WTF?! It speaks to management performing works and making changes without proper planning or analysis. So yes. The report finds the water level is of primary importance and that an automated control system should be in place to halt the ride and operation of the conveyor in the event it occurs. They are not talking about indicator lights being installed if water level monitoring was installed because they already found warning lights signifying the pump stoppage on the control panel were an inadequate control system. Further to this point, talk of a safety interlock being installed for the conveyor is exactly what you are querying. An interlock shuts off power to a device and it cannot be restarted or reset until the issue is rectified. It means it has the ability to stop it being restarted in the event of a failure which would address a situation like the 2014 incident where the operator was dismissed from occurring. We can argue sensors vs conveyor and how it would be implemented all we want but the report says it best really. They knew the rafts can hit. They knew the rafts could be lifted and even flipped. They knew the water level was critical for the ride to function. They knew people were not capable of managing the risk on the ride and had fired an employee to the fact. They knew all this from in house incidences and experiences and did little to mitigate or exclude the risk of injury or death and are entirely to blame for the tragedy.

How can you infer that? It clearly states and is the view of multiple parties that a safety feature that monitored water levels is what was needed. The conveyor is already monitored and gated. How is it the problem? That they are proposing is that the water level monitoring would have, within seconds of the pump stopping, halted the conveyor. This would have caused a ride safety fault. This was 100% relied upon by humans to judge. The report found this completely unacceptable, because even someone completely aware of the water level dropping would not be expected to react in time, and the difference between human and automated process would prevent an incident like this occurring 100% Its why they keep ramming home the phrase risk assessment. Its literally a document that studies what is at risk, the potential for injury or death, how this risk can be mitigated or removed completely. They are so common they are used daily, across multiple facets. It shouldnt have even been a yearly thing, one should have been performed anytime someone was to work on the ride or attend a shut down because there is a massive risk to staff when working on plant equipment like this, so assessments remove complacency about the dangers of being in that environment. Following multiple shutdowns, the incidents should have been debriefed within the management team. Dreamworld acknowledged they have meetings that do exactly that, address failures and breakdowns. This is when further risk to ride operation should have been discussed. Its why the report finds there is a systemic failure within the management of the park as every level of management ultimately failed to manage the risk.

You missed the reasoning for the proposal, not the physical plans for the upgrade. Its in the paragraph above it. Starts at paragraph 129.

Heres another from the senior investigating the incident. "WOULD HAVE COMPLETELY PREVENTED THIS INCIDENT FROM OCCURRING".

It's not evwn remotely the same. It's different when youve had multiple incidents in the past that have lifted the rafts due to water level; youve had an incident where it was shown one of your most experienced operators was not able to manage the ride operation when a low water level fault occurrs, placing people in danger; By your own proceedures acknowledge low water levels are an extremely dangerous situation, cause for a ride stoppage due to safety issues; AND The issue had been highlighted a number of times in the past by inspections and staff and was considered important enough to quote for the upgrade, but was never acted upon. Experts testified exactly that. Including one of the police investigators. The 10k cost included water level and plc upgrade. Heres an example. This expert was one tasked by the Office of Industrial Relations to investigate the ride control systems and its operation after the incident..

Bulk buy? Two for 1? 😄

It was noted that at the time the above was raised in regards to implementing an upgrade the cost was $10,000. At this time the engineering manager acknowledged the proposal but directed that the existing plan for upgrades of sensors at the start of the conveyor preventing roll back was the focus. Nothing further was done. $2500 each. Someone, or a group of someones decided that our lives werent worth $2500. Lets make no mistake, while a number of failures had to occurr for the incident to play out, the report makes it clear that it was sheer luck, not good or proper management that further (or earlier) deaths had not occurred. $2500. Each. Let that sink in. What does $2500 buy you? A new tv? A used car? A short holiday? Its abhorrent a life is reduced to such a worthless sum. These people ruined 4 lives directly, destroyed families in the process, exposing kids to something adults are not capable of handling, and resulted in many people, their own staff included suffering psycological trauma they are still dealing with. None of you should have any jobs. Many of you should be turned out for contributing directly to their deaths and face the possibility of jail time, and any penalties leveled at ardent should be so severe that any company even contemplating putting a price on the lives and safety of your guests and staff should only have to mention the name dreamworld before being instantly aware of their stupidity. Ill be really fucking surprised if the company is even penalised a 7 figure sum. And thats a god damn travesty the qld government should automatically appeal because its in the interests of the whole country that an element of justice is actually served and someone, if not multiple people have been held to account.

Excellent break down provided. Very well done. The whole report is like a textbook of how not to maintain safe operational control of a theme park. I got to about page 180 of the report before i needed a break. Its hard reading, frustrating, makes you angry, makes you mad. Its really all over the place with the complete almost cascading like failure through just about all levels of management. Its literally like a bunch of these people got together and collectively decided nobody told them how to do their jobs, so that absolves them of any responsibility. We will just pretend theres nothing to address. Thats before you get to the actual findings on the ride which basically reduce it down to a few things; Water level. Lack of automated monitoring of water level tied into a safety system that would halt the ride when water level drops below a safe level. Lack of a single dedicated estop that halts all operation and a complex stop proceedure. Gap between conveyor and axle to the supporting rails in the trough was an issue and should have been picked up by any competent engineer. Gaps between slats on conveyor. Staff training, competency and understanding of ride operation, largely due to inadequate operational proceedures all staff should base their training upon. A number of upgrades were proposed that would improve operational safety. It was noted in particular that the lack of warning or automated stoppage due to water level dropping after pump failure was a direct contributor to the deaths. The danger was highlighted with previous incidents, including the last incident that lead to an operators dismissal. At no stage were these issues improved upon or addressed to prevent similar breakdown in operation of the ride both at a mechanical and operations (staff) level. On top of that, these failings were not shared with other staff and a number of managers had no knowledge of previous incidents. There was really, really disturbing insight into the lack of documentation, error reporting and compliance that existed in most departments which was highlighted by a number of independant auditors, even when not tasked with actual ride investigation. Poor implementation of recommendations and lack of improvement were noted, though big improvements had been made in the lead up to the accident. Basically, the short short version of what happened on the day is stuff went wrong. A Combination of existing design, uncontrolled modification, faults during operation and operation of the ride on the day contributed to the deaths. There was enough opportunity to address a number of issues which would have reduced risk or completely prevented the deaths from occuring. None of these actions were taken by ardent or park management and directly contributed to the deaths.

It seems like there is as they have referred it to them. Its entirely up to the OIR to decide if they will follow through with it though. The coroner has nothing to do with civil or industrial action. They cant say someone is culpable and hand out fines. They cant prosecute someone essentially. Its an office that is supposed to stay neutral and hand down the facts as investigated.

There is only ever one inquest by the coroner. Civil lawsuits will follow, plus maybe any industrial action like jail time and fines. That all depends on if OIR (office industrial relations) thinks they have enough evidence to launch prosecution.

They are at a yard in arundel. On kendor street.

No, im pretty sure these are the cars from the broadbeach monorail we were thinking would just be scrapped. Looks like someone kept/purchased them.

Bit of a thread dig, but while sorting out some cranes for a new project we are about to start, im pretty sure i stumbled upon the cars.

Im not even sure if a belt style conveyor would have stopped the issue happening. Part of the problem looks like theres a decent gap between the end of the conveyor and the steel supports in the trough which is normally submerged. Being at mismatched heights, if it happened that the raft lifted after bumping into the one stalled on the supports already, a belt style conveyor might still have grabbed the rubber tube part of the raft and pulled it into the gap at the end of the conveyor. They are pretty grippy to be able to pull a water soaked boat or raft out of the water. The water level dropping so everything was exposed might be the biggest contributing factor.

Who would have thought a launch coaster would need yearly down time on anything that wasnt a train. You know, like the whole launch system, those cables, massive drum, complex hydraulic drive unit with multiple stages and all those hoses. Nope. None of that needs any down time. Why arent they scheduling it on christmas or anzac day? The park is closed, im sure they can get it all done by lunch time.

Yes. You can completely tear down, send out for inspection, paint and rebuild a train in 2 weeks. They are clearly saving money by staying shut an extra 2 weeks. Would you be upset if I called you a muppet?

Go for it. And id also like you to post with how you think the footings move and how thick the tubing is to cause these vast changes that werent already there when it was built.

The only difference might be in material if the operating climate is different. Otherwise they are all coming from the same manufacturer.

Train wheels, axles and bearings would replaced yearly at a minimum. The amount of runout would be checked weekly, if not daily. I imagine trains are aligned every week too. So essentially, the train should be within spec at all times. So what wear are you talking about? Same with the track. How do you think it really wears? A few mm change in overall track gauge is pretty minor when the coaster rolling around with possibly 2 or 3 times that wear factor built into wheel clearances to make it round the track. Personally, i think the padding changes a bit as it compresses and doesnt feel so supple. Its probably only replaced when its damaged or torn. And technology gets better, track designs get smoother, the gap comparing new vs old is greater. I imagine the margins of error when producing track now is probably so small you can run trains tighter than ever before too. 15 or 20 years ago you were comparing with coasters that would be 30 or 40 years old by now if they were still in service. So something like cyclone/sidewinder/whatever was far smoother running and quieter compared to the thunderbolt. Fast forward twenty years and it IS the thunderbolt. That and people get old. Harden up and get rattled about a bit like when teenagers. 😝

If they are rough due to that, they were always rough. How much material do you think is in the track? Thickness wise i mean.

In the plaza near the big screen? They are kind of seasonal i think. Anytime there is an event coming up/on, they seem to get moved around/out a lot so they can use the spacd. Otherwise the whole area is usually full of maybe a couple dozen bench style tables.

Nah, unlike those people, you don't seem to be able to process rational thought. It's the world according to skeet and everything else is nonsense.

Like coasters, they are probably going to have to start building slides for a bigger generation soon if its a problem. Im not talking about fatter, i mean physically larger. Im just over 6ft tall, when I was a kid I was on the tall end of my classes. These days, 14 year old kids walk past and eye ball me. By the time they reach full growth, 195cm and 100kg isn't abnormal. The models used are well outdated.

Prime for what though? Someone heavily into thrill rides would argue movieworld was never better following the opening of dc rivals. Someone that views experience and an entire day out would probably like the movieworld back with excellent shows, pre main street roof, parades that did more than just drive a loop through main street and the "classic" lineup of rides like looney tunes river ride, gremlins, studio tours, etc.